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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 1
Karen Korematsu, Jay Hirabayashi, and Holly
Yasui, the children of Fred Korematsu, Gordon
Hirabayashi,
and
Minoru
Yasui,
come
This brief is filed with the consent of all parties through letters
of consent on file with the Clerk. No counsel for any party
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity
other than amici curiae made a monetary contribution intended
to fund the brief’s preparation or submission.
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forward as amici curiae because they see the
disturbing relevance of this Court’s decisions in their
fathers’ infamous cases challenging the mass removal
and incarceration of Japanese Americans during
World War II to the serious questions raised by
Executive Order 13780.
Minoru Yasui was a 25-year-old attorney in
Portland, Oregon, when, on March 28, 1942, he
intentionally defied the government’s first actionable
order imposing a curfew on persons of Japanese
ancestry in order to bring a test case challenging its
constitutionality. See Yasui v. United States, 320
U.S. 115 (1943). Gordon Hirabayashi was a 24-yearold college senior in Seattle, Washington, when he
similarly chose to defy the government’s curfew and
removal orders on May 16, 1942. See Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). Fred Korematsu
was a 22-year-old welder in Oakland, California,
when, on May 30, 1942, he was arrested for refusing
to report for removal. See Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
All three men brought their constitutional
challenges to this Court.
Deferring to the
government’s claim that the orders were justified by
military necessity, the Court affirmed their
convictions. Our Nation has since recognized that
the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese
Americans was wrong; the three cases have been
widely condemned; and all three men have been
recognized with the Presidential Medal of Freedom
for their wartime courage and lifetime work
advancing civil and human rights.
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Their children have sought to carry forward
their fathers’ legacy, educating the public and, as
appropriate, reminding the courts of the harm
wrought by governmental actions, carried out in the
name of national security, that impact men, women,
and children belonging to disfavored minority
groups—both the human toll and the danger of
sacrificing our country’s fundamental values. Guilt,
loyalty, and threat are individual attributes. Courts
must be vigilant when these attributes are imputed
to entire racial, religious, and/or ethnic groups. The
Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu cases stand as
important symbols of the need for courts—and
especially this Court—to fulfill their essential role in
our democracy by checking unfounded exercises of
executive power.
The Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui
families are proud to stand with the following public
interest organizations:
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and
Equality (“Korematsu Center”) is based at the Seattle
University School of Law. Inspired by the legacy of
Fred Korematsu, the Korematsu Center works to
advance justice for all through research, advocacy,
and education. The Korematsu Center has a special
interest in addressing government action targeting
classes of persons based on race, nationality, or
religion and in seeking to ensure that courts
understand the historical—and, at times, profoundly
unjust—underpinnings of arguments asserted to
support the exercise of such unchecked executive
power. The Korematsu Center does not, in this brief
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or otherwise, represent the official views of Seattle
University.
Asian Americans Advancing Justice (“Advancing
Justice”) is the national affiliation of five nonpartisan
civil
rights
organizations:
Asian Americans
Advancing Justice – AAJC; Asian Americans
Advancing Justice – Asian Law Caucus; Asian
Americans Advancing Justice – Atlanta; Asian
Americans Advancing Justice – Chicago; and Asian
Americans Advancing Justice – Los Angeles.
Through direct services, impact litigation, amicus
briefs, policy advocacy, leadership development, and
capacity building, the Advancing Justice affiliates
advocate for marginalized members of the Asian
American, Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander, and
other underserved communities, including immigrant
members of those communities.
The Asian American Legal Defense and
Education Fund (“AALDEF”), founded in 1974, is a
national organization that protects and promotes the
civil rights of Asian Americans.
By combining
litigation, advocacy, education, and organizing,
AALDEF works with Asian American communities
across the country to secure human rights for all. In
1982, AALDEF supported reparations for Japanese
Americans forcibly relocated and imprisoned during
World War II. After 9/11, AALDEF represented more
than 800 individuals from Muslim-majority countries
who were called in to report to immigration
authorities under the Special Registration program.
AALDEF is currently providing community education
and legal counseling to Asian Americans affected by
the challenged Executive Order.
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The Hispanic National Bar Association
(“HNBA”) is comprised of thousands of Latino
lawyers, law professors, law students, legal
professionals, state and federal judges, legislators,
and bar affiliates across the country. The HNBA
supports Hispanic legal professionals and is
committed to advocacy on issues of importance,
including immigration and protection of refugees, to
the 53 million people of Hispanic heritage living in
the United States.
The Japanese American Citizens League of
Hawaii, Honolulu Chapter (“JACL Honolulu”) draws
upon Hawaii’s rich, multiethnic society and strong
cultural values, but has a broad focus on addressing
discrimination and intolerance towards all people
victimized by injustice and prejudice.
JACL
Honolulu has supported redress for Japanese
Americans incarcerated during World War II and
sponsors annual events to educate the public
regarding that unjust incarceration, one of the core
reasons for the founding of the JACL Honolulu
chapter.
LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Inc. (“LatinoJustice”) is
a national civil rights legal defense fund that has
defended the constitutional rights and equal
protection of all Latinos under the law.
LatinoJustice’s continuing mission is to promote the
civic participation of the greater pan-Latino
community in the United States, to cultivate Latino
community leaders, and to engage in and support law
reform litigation across the country addressing
criminal justice, education, employment, fair
housing, immigrants’ rights, language rights,
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redistricting, and voting rights. During its 45-year
history, LatinoJustice has litigated numerous cases
in both state and federal courts challenging multiple
forms of racial discrimination by government actors.
The National Bar Association (“NBA”) is the
largest and oldest association of predominantly
African-American attorneys and judges in the United
States. The NBA was founded in 1925 when there
were only 1,000 African-American attorneys in the
entire country and when other national bar
associations, such as the American Bar Association,
did
not
admit
African-American
attorneys.
Throughout its history, the NBA consistently has
advocated on behalf of African Americans and other
minority populations regarding issues affecting the
legal profession.
The NBA has a network of
approximately 66,000 lawyers, judges, law professors,
and law students, and it has over 75 affiliate
chapters.
The South Asian Bar Association of North
America (“SABA”) is the umbrella organization for 26
regional bar associations in North America
representing the interests of over 6,000 attorneys of
South Asian descent. SABA provides a vital link for
the South Asian community to the law and the legal
system. Within the United States, SABA takes an
active interest in the legal rights of South Asian and
other minority communities. Members of SABA
include immigration lawyers and others who
represent persons that have been and will be affected
by the Executive Order.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT
“Often the question has been raised whether this
country could wage a new war without the loss of its
fundamental liberties at home. Here is one occasion
for this Court to give an unequivocal answer to that
question and show the world that we can fight for
democracy and preserve it too.”
Gordon Hirabayashi made that plea to the Court
in 1943, as he appealed his conviction for violating
military orders issued three months after the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Authorized by
Executive Order No. 9066, those orders led to the
forced removal and incarceration of over 120,000
men, women, and children of Japanese descent.
Mr. Hirabayashi did not stand alone before this
Court. Minoru Yasui likewise invoked our Nation’s
ideals in casting his separate but related appeal as
“the case of all whose parents came to our shores for
a haven of refuge” and insisting that the country
should respond to war and strife “in the American
way and not by *** acts of injustice.” Appellant Br.
55-56, Yasui v. United States, No. 871 (U.S. Apr. 30,
1943). The Court denied the appeals of both men.
See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943);
Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
The following year, this Court revisited the mass
removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans in
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In
Korematsu, the Court again failed to stand as a
bulwark
against
governmental
action
that
undermines core constitutional principles.
By
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refusing to scrutinize the government’s claim that its
abhorrent treatment of Japanese Americans was
justified by military necessity, the Court enabled the
government to cover its racially discriminatory
policies in the cloak of national security.
In this case, the Court is once again asked to
abdicate its critical role in safeguarding fundamental
freedoms.
Invoking national security, the
government seeks near complete deference to the
President’s decision to deny visas and suspend the
entry of refugees from six Muslim-majority nations.
Although the government claims it is merely asking
for the application of established legal principles, the
extreme deference it seeks is not rooted in sound
constitutional tradition. Rather, it rests on doctrinal
tenets infected with long-repudiated racial and
nativist precepts.
In support of the sweeping
proposition that the President’s authority to exclude
aliens is unbounded, the government previously
invoked the so-called “plenary power” doctrine—a
doctrine that derives from decisions such as Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889),
which relied on pejorative racial stereotypes to
eschew judicial scrutiny in upholding a law that
prohibited Chinese laborers from returning to the
United States after travel abroad. Id. at 595.
In its briefs before this Court, the government
has changed its words but not its message nor its
impact. While no longer invoking the term “plenary
power,” the government continues to assert that
“federal courts may not second-guess the political
branches’ decisions to exclude aliens abroad,”
including, as here, entire classes of aliens. Gov’t Br.
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20. As the Ninth Circuit observed, the numbing
judicial passivity the government demands “runs
contrary to the fundamental structure of our
constitutional democracy” in which “it is the role of
the judiciary to interpret the law, a duty that will
sometimes require the ‘[r]esolution of litigation
challenging the constitutional authority of one of the
three branches.’” Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d
1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original)
(quoting Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566
U.S. 189, 196 (2012)).
Even more than the early “plenary power”
decisions, the shades of Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and
Yasui lurking in the government’s argument should
give this Court pause. As here, the government there
denied that its policies were grounded in “invidious
*** discrimination” and asked the Court to take it at
its word that “the security of the nation” justified
blanket action against an “entire group *** at once.”
Gov’t Br. 35, Hirabayashi v. United States, No. 870
(U.S. May 8, 1943).
This Court agreed, employing a double negative
to conclude that, even though racial distinctions are
“odious to a free people,” it “[could] []not reject as
unfounded the judgment” of the government.
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99-100. Going further in
Korematsu, the Court denied that race played any
role in the government’s decisions: “cast[ing] this case
into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to
the real military dangers which were presented,
merely confuses the issue.”
323 U.S. at 223.
Accepting the government’s assurance, the Court
went on to find that “Korematsu was not excluded
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from the [West Coast] because of hostility to him or
his race, he was excluded because *** the properly
constituted military authorities *** decided that the
military urgency of the situation demanded that all
citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated ***
temporarily.” Id.
Not all members of the Court were convinced,
however. Three Justices dissented, including Justice
Murphy, who declared that the exclusion of Japanese
Americans from the West Coast “falls into the ugly
abyss of racism,” Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233, and
Justice Jackson, who pointed out that the Court “had
no real evidence” to support the government’s
assertions of military necessity. Moreover, Justice
Jackson warned, the Court had created “a loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can
bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”
Id. at 246.
As history has made us acutely aware, the
dissenters’ doubts as to the veracity of the
government’s assertion of military necessity were
well-founded, and their recognition of the gravity of
the Court’s decision was prophetic. Four decades
later, Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred
Korematsu successfully sought vacatur of their
convictions
in
unprecedented
coram
nobis
proceedings.
Evidence presented in those cases
showed that the “military urgency” on which this
Court predicated its decision was nothing more than
a smokescreen: the real reason for the government’s
deplorable treatment of Japanese Americans was not
acts of espionage (as the government maintained) but
rather a baseless perception of disloyalty grounded in
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racial stereotypes. In 2011, in an extraordinary
“confession of error,” the Acting Solicitor General
acknowledged the government’s role in the
miscarriage of justice found by the coram nobis
courts: before Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu
first reached the Court, the government had known
that its own intelligence “undermined the rationale”
behind the mass removal and incarceration program,
and relied for its defense of those policies on “gross
generalizations about Japanese Americans, such as
that they were disloyal and motivated by ‘racial
solidarity.’” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Confession of
Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the
Japanese-American Internment Cases (May 20, 2011),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/confession-errorsolicitor-generals-mistakes-during-japaneseamerican-internment-cases.
Korematsu, and by inference Hirabayashi and
Yasui, “stands as a constant caution that in times of
war or declared military necessity our institutions
must be vigilant in protecting constitutional
guarantees” and “national security must not be used
to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny
and accountability.” Korematsu v. United States, 584
F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Put simply,
those cases “illustrated that it can be highly
destructive of civil liberties to understand the
Constitution as giving the President a blank check.”
STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD:
AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 84
(2015).
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui are as
wrong today as they were on the day they were
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decided.
If it were to accept the government’s
invitation here to abdicate its judicial responsibility,
the Court would repeat its failures in those widely
condemned cases. The Court should instead take this
opportunity to acknowledge the historic wrong in
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui, and to repudiate
its refusal to scrutinize the government’s claim of
necessity and its consequent failure to recognize the
military orders’ racist underpinnings. Heeding the
lessons of history, the Court should subject Executive
Order 13780 to meaningful judicial scrutiny and
affirm the Founders’ visionary principle that an
independent and vigilant judiciary is a foundational
element of a healthy democracy.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE GOVERNMENT’S CONCEPTION OF
PLENARY
POWER
DERIVES
FROM
CASES INFECTED WITH RACIST AND
XENOPHOBIC PREJUDICES.

The government predicated its defense of the
original Executive Order on the argument that the
“political branches[] [have] plenary constitutional
authority over foreign affairs, national security, and
immigration.”
Gov’t Emergency Mot. 15-16,
Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 4,
2017). In light of that “plenary authority,” the
government asserted, “[j]udicial second-guessing of
the President’s determination that a temporary
suspension of entry of certain classes of aliens was
necessary *** to protect national security ***
constitute[s] an impermissible intrusion.” Id. at 15.
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Despite shedding the “plenary power” label
before this Court, the government’s central argument
remains unchanged: The political branches’ “power
to *** exclude aliens” is “largely immune from
judicial control.” Gov’t Br. 23 (ellipsis in original)
(quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)).
This Court, however, has never recognized an
unbridled “plenary” power in the immigration realm
that would preclude judicial review. And to the
extent that it has shown excessive deference to the
political branches in some cases, those precedents are
linked to racist attitudes from a past era that have
long since fallen out of favor.
1. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, known
as The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court upheld a
statute preventing the return of Chinese laborers
who had departed the United States prior to its
passage. 130 U.S. at 581-582. Describing the
reasons underlying the law’s enactment, the Court
characterized Chinese laborers as “content with the
simplest fare, such as would not suffice for our
laborers and artisans,” and observed that they
remained “strangers in the land, residing apart by
themselves, *** adhering to the customs and usages
of their own country,” and unable “to assimilate with
our people.” Id. at 595. “The differences of race
added greatly to the difficulties of the situation.” Id.
Residents of the West Coast, the Court explained,
warned of an “Oriental invasion” and “saw or
believed they saw *** great danger that at no distant
day *** [the West] would be overrun by them, unless
prompt action was taken to restrict their
immigration.” Id.
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Far from applying a skeptical eye to the law in
light of the clear animus motivating its passage, the
Court found that “[i]f *** the government of the
United States, through its legislative department,
considers the presence of foreigners of a different race
in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be
dangerous to its peace and security *** its
determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.” The
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606; see also
Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the
Chinese Exclusion Cases:
The Plenary Power
Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights,
10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 15 (2003). In reality, the “right of
self-preservation” that the Court validated as
justification for the government’s unbounded power
to exclude immigrants was ethnic and racial selfpreservation, not the preservation of borders or
national security. 130 U.S. at 608; see id. at 606 (“It
matters not in what form *** aggression and
encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation
acting in its national character, or from vast hordes
of its people crowding in upon us.”).
Similar racist and xenophobic attitudes are
evident in decisions following The Chinese Exclusion
Case. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 729-730 (1893) (upholding requirement that
Chinese resident aliens offer “at least one credible
white witness” in order to remain in the country); id.
at 730 (noting Congress’s belief that testimony from
Chinese witnesses could not be credited because of
“the loose notions entertained by the witnesses of the
obligation of an oath” (quoting The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. at 598)).
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2. Even in its early plenary power decisions,
however, the Court recognized that the government’s
sovereign authority is subject to constitutional
limitations. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. at 604 (“[S]overeign powers *** [are] restricted
in their exercise only by the constitution itself and
considerations of public policy and justice which
control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized
nations.”). Indeed, from the doctrine’s inception, the
Court divided over the reach of the government’s
power in light of those limitations.
Fong Yue Ting, which upheld a law requiring
Chinese laborers residing in the United States to
obtain a special certificate of residence to avoid
deportation, generated three dissenting opinions. See
149 U.S. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“I deny that
there is any arbitrary and unrestrained power to
banish residents, even resident aliens.”); id. at 744
(Field, J., dissenting); id. at 761 (Fuller, J.,
dissenting). Even Justice Field, who authored the
Court’s opinion in The Chinese Exclusion Case,
sought to limit the plenary power doctrine’s
application with regard to alien residents:
As men having our common humanity, they
are protected by all the guaranties of the
constitution. To hold that they are subject
to any different law, or are less protected in
any particular, than other persons, is *** to
ignore the teachings of our history *** and
the language of our constitution.
Id. at 754.
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Nearly 60 years later, judicial skepticism
regarding an unrestrained plenary power persisted—
and proliferated. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952), the Court, relying on Korematsu (see
note 2, infra), upheld a provision permitting the
deportation of resident aliens who were members of
the Communist Party. In dissent, Justice Douglas
quoted Justice Brewer’s words in Fong Yue Ting,
observing that they “grow[] in power with the passing
years”:
This doctrine of powers inherent in
sovereignty is one both indefinite and
dangerous. *** The governments of other
nations have elastic powers. Ours are fixed
and bounded by a written constitution. The
expulsion of a race may be within the
inherent powers of a despotism. History,
before the adoption of this constitution, was
not destitute of examples of the exercise of
such a power; and its framers were familiar
with history, and wisely, as it seems to me,
they gave to this government no general
power to banish.
Id. at 599-600.
In another McCarthy-era precedent, four
Justices advocated for limitations on the plenary
power doctrine. In Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), the Court rejected
any constitutional challenge to the exclusion of an
alien who had previously resided in the United
States, despite his resulting indefinite detention at
Ellis Island. In dissent, Justice Black, joined by
Justice Douglas, reasoned that “[n]o society is free
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where government makes one person’s liberty depend
upon the arbitrary will of another.” Id. at 217.
“Dictatorships,” he observed, “have done this since
time immemorial. They do now.” Id. Justice
Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter, added that
such aliens must be “accorded procedural due process
of law.” Id. at 224.
3. Perhaps reflecting the shift away from the
xenophobic
and
race-based
characterizations
prevalent in its early plenary power precedents, the
Court in recent years has been more willing to
enforce
constitutional
limitations
on
the
government’s authority over immigration matters.
In Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), for
example, the Court held that INS regulations must at
least
“rationally
advanc[e]
some
legitimate
governmental purpose.” Id. at 306. In Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), the Court affirmed
that a resident alien returning from a brief trip
abroad must be afforded due process in an exclusion
proceeding. Id. at 33. And in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678 (2001), in response to the government’s
contention that “Congress has ‘plenary power’ to
create immigration law, and *** the Judicial Branch
must defer to Executive and Legislative Branch
decisionmaking in that area,” the Court observed
that such “power is subject to important
constitutional limitations.”
Id. at 695 (citations
omitted). “[F]ocus[ing] upon those limitations,” id.,
the Court determined that the indefinite detention of
aliens deemed removable would raise “serious
constitutional concerns” and accordingly construed
the statute at issue to avoid those problems, id. at
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682. See generally Washington, 847 F.3d at 11621163 (collecting cases demonstrating reviewability of
federal government action in immigration and
national security matters).
The Court’s most recent decision in this area
provides further support for the conclusion that, after
more than a century of erosion, the notion of plenary
power over immigration is little more than a relic.
In Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015), this
Court considered a due process claim arising from the
denial without adequate explanation of a spouse’s
visa application. Although it described the power of
the political branches over immigration as “plenary,”
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Din made
clear that courts may review an exercise of that
power.
Id. at 2139-2140.
Justice Kennedy
acknowledged that the Court in Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), had declined to balance
the constitutional rights of American citizens injured
by a visa denial against “Congress’ ‘plenary power to
make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude
those who possess those characteristics which
Congress has forbidden.’” Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139
(quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766). But he explained
that the Court did inquire “whether the Government
had provided a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide’
reason for its action.” Id. at 2140 (quoting Mandel,
408 U.S. at 770). And while as a general matter
courts are not to “look behind” the government’s
asserted reason, courts should do so if the challenger
has made “an affirmative showing of bad faith.” Id.
at 2141.
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To be sure, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Din
acknowledged that the political branches are entitled
to wide latitude and deference in immigration
matters. For that reason, the government relies
heavily on Din and Mandel to argue that its assertion
of a national security rationale is sufficient to justify
the Executive Order and to preclude further judicial
scrutiny. But, as the courts of appeals recognized,
Din (and Mandel before it) concerned an individual
visa denial on the facts of that case. By contrast, the
Executive Order sets a nationwide immigration
policy, presumptively suspending entry and
foreclosing visa adjudications for virtually all aliens
of certain nationalities. While it may be sensible for
courts ordinarily to defer to the judgment of the
political branches when considering the application of
immigration law to a particular alien, the President’s
decision to issue a broadly-applicable immigration
policy—especially one aimed at nationals of
particular countries likely to share a common
religion—is properly the subject of more searching
judicial review.
All told, modern judicial precedent supports the
notion that courts have both the power and the
responsibility to review Executive Order 13780.
Where, as here, the Court is asked to review a farreaching program—promulgated at the highest level
of the Executive Branch and targeting aliens based
on nationality and religion—precedent and common
sense demand more than an assessment of whether
the government has offered a “facially legitimate and
bona fide” rationale for its policy. Rather, this
Executive Order, both on its face and in light of the
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glaring clues as to its motivations, cries out for
careful judicial scrutiny.
II.

KOREMATSU, HIRABAYASHI, AND YASUI
STAND AS STARK REMINDERS OF THE
NEED
FOR
SEARCHING
JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
TARGETING DISFAVORED MINORITIES
IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY.

This Court need not look far for a reminder of
the constitutional costs and human suffering that
flow from the Judiciary’s failure to rein in sweeping
governmental action against disfavored minorities.
And it need not look far for a reminder of the
Executive Branch’s use of national security as a
pretext to discriminate against such groups. The
Court need look only to its own precedents—its all
but universally condemned wartime decisions in
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui.
1. On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt
issued Executive Order No. 9066, authorizing the
Secretary of War to designate “military areas” from
which “any or all persons” could be excluded and
“with respect to which, the right of any person to
enter, remain in, or leave” would be subject to
“whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the
appropriate Military Commander may impose.”
Exec. Order No. 9066, “Authorizing the Secretary of
War to Prescribe Military Areas,” 7 Fed. Reg. 1407,
1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). Adding its imprimatur to the
Executive Order, Congress made violation of any
restrictions issued thereunder a federal offense. An
Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat.
173.
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Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, head of the
Western Defense Command, used that authority to
issue a series of proclamations that led to the
removal and incarceration of all individuals of
Japanese ancestry living in “Military Area No. 1”—an
exclusion area covering the entire Pacific Coast.
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 89. A curfew order came
first. Soon after, Japanese Americans were ordered
to abandon their homes and communities on the
West Coast for tarpaper barracks (euphemistically
called “relocation centers”) surrounded by barbed
wire and machine gun towers in desolate areas
inland. Id. at 90.
For different individual reasons, but sharing a
deep sense of justice, Minoru Yasui, Gordon
Hirabayashi, and Fred Korematsu refused to comply
with General DeWitt’s orders.
Yasui, a young
lawyer, regarded the curfew as an affront to
American constitutional values. “To make it a crime
for me to do the same thing as any non-Japanese
person *** solely on the basis of ancestry,” he
explained, “was, in my opinion, an absolutely
abominable concept and wholly unacceptable.”
Testimony of Minoru Yasui, Nat’l Comm. for Redress,
Japanese Am. Citizens League 9, Comm’n on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
(1981). “Our law and our basic concept of justice had
always been founded upon the fundamental principle
that no person should be punished but for that
individual’s act, and not because of one’s ancestry.”
Id. at 10. Convinced of the curfew’s illegality, Yasui
immediately defied it in order to initiate a
constitutional challenge.
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Hirabayashi, a student at the University of
Washington, also defied the orders so that he could
challenge their constitutionality, saying that he
“considered it [his] duty to maintain the democratic
standards for which this nation lives.” PETER IRONS,
JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 88 (1984). Korematsu,
a welder living in Oakland, CA, refused to obey the
removal orders so that he could remain with his
fiancée who was not subject to removal because she
was not Japanese American. The last of the three to
face arrest and prosecution, Korematsu “shared with
Yasui and Hirabayashi an equal devotion to
constitutional principle” and believed that the statute
under which he was convicted was wrong. Id. at 98.
2. The constitutional challenges Yasui,
Hirabayashi, and Korematsu made to the military
orders soon made their way to this Court. But far
from fulfilling its essential role in the constitutional
structure that entrusts the Judiciary with the
protection of fundamental rights, the Court set upon
a path of judicial abdication that today serves as a
cautionary tale.
In Hirabayashi’s case, the Court elected to
consider only his conviction for violating the curfew
order, leaving unanswered his challenge to his
conviction for failing to report to a Civil Control
Station—a precursor to removal from his home in
Seattle. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85. Harkening
back to The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court
repeated the government’s claim that “social,
economic and political conditions” “intensified the[]
solidarity” of Japanese Americans and “prevented
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their assimilation as an integral part of the white
population.” Id. at 96. Betraying no skepticism of
these premises, the Court found that, in view of these
and other attributes of the “isolation” of Japanese
Americans and their “relatively little social
intercourse *** [with] the white population,”
“Congress and the Executive could reasonably have
concluded that these conditions *** encouraged the
continued attachment of members of this group to
Japan and Japanese institutions.”
Id. at 98.
“Whatever views we may entertain regarding the
loyalty to this country of the citizens of Japanese
ancestry,” the Court continued, “we cannot reject as
unfounded the judgment of the military authorities
and of Congress that there were disloyal members of
that population, whose number and strength could
not be precisely and quickly ascertained.” Id. at 99.
Having upheld the curfew in Hirabayashi, the
Court issued only a short opinion remanding Yasui’s
case to the Ninth Circuit. Yasui, 320 U.S. at 115.
Because the district court had imposed a sentence
based on its determination that Yasui had renounced
his American citizenship, and the government did not
defend that finding, the Court remanded the matter
for resentencing. Id. at 117. The Court thereby
avoided addressing the lower court’s conclusion,
supported by extensive analysis, that the military
orders were unconstitutional as applied to citizens.
See United States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40, 44-54 (D.
Or. 1942).
The Court’s third opportunity to confront the
mass removal and incarceration program came a
year-and-a-half later, in Korematsu’s case.
The

24
Court again narrowed the issues before it, rejecting
Korematsu’s argument that the removal order could
not be extricated from the incarceration he would
inevitably face if he complied with that order. 323
U.S. at 216. Then, despite affirming that racial
distinctions are “immediately suspect” and “must [be]
subject *** to the most rigid scrutiny,” id., the Court
denied, without probing examination, that the
military orders were driven by racial hostility. The
Court reiterated its conclusion from Hirabayashi that
it would not substitute its judgment for that of the
military authorities.
There was evidence of
disloyalty on the part of some,” the Court reasoned,
and “the military authorities considered that the
need for action was great, and time was short. We
cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective
of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions
were unjustified.” Id. at 223-224.
When the Court decided Korematsu, however,
three members rejected the government’s arguments.
In vigorous dissents, Justices Murphy and Jackson
sharply questioned the validity of the military
justification the government advanced. Although
acknowledging that the discretion of those entrusted
with national security matters “must, as a matter of
*** common sense, be wide,” Justice Murphy declared
that “it is essential that there be definite limits to
military discretion” and that individuals not be “left
impoverished of their constitutional rights on a plea
of military necessity that has neither substance nor
support.” 323 U.S. at 234. In his view, the exclusion
order “clearly d[id] not meet th[is] test” as it relied
“for its reasonableness upon the assumption that all
persons of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous
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tendency to commit sabotage and espionage.” Id. at
234-235 (emphasis added).
In fact, as Justice
Murphy noted, intelligence investigations found no
evidence of Japanese American sabotage or
espionage. Id. at 241. And even if “there were some
disloyal persons of Japanese descent on the Pacific
Coast,” Justice Murphy reasoned, “to infer that
examples of individual disloyalty prove group
disloyalty and justify discriminatory action against
the entire group” is nothing more than “th[e]
legalization of racism.” Id. at 240-241, 242.
Justice Jackson was equally skeptical of the
factual basis for the government’s claim that General
DeWitt’s orders were justified. “How does the Court
know that these orders have a reasonable basis in
necessity?” 323 U.S. at 245. Pointing out that “[n]o
evidence whatever on that subject ha[d] been taken
by this or any other court” and that General DeWitt’s
“Final Report” on which the government relied was
the subject of “sharp controversy as to [its]
credibility,” Justice Jackson observed that the Court
had “no real evidence before it.” Id. Accordingly, the
Court “ha[d] no choice but to accept General DeWitt’s
own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by
any cross-examination, that what he did was
reasonable.” Id.
Justice Jackson saw grave dangers in the
Court’s opinion. While an unconstitutional military
order is short lived, he observed, “once a judicial
opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it
conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes
the Constitution to show that the Constitution
sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has
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validated the principle of racial discrimination in
criminal procedure and of transplanting American
citizens.” 323 U.S. at 246. With that, Justice
Jackson issued a prophetic warning: By “validat[ing]
the principle of racial discrimination in criminal
procedure and of transplanting American citizens,”
the Court had created “a loaded weapon ready for the
hand of any authority that can bring forward a
plausible claim of an urgent need.” Id. 2
3. The dissenters’ fears proved to be wellfounded. Decades after this Court’s decisions in
Hirabayashi,
Yasui,
and
Korematsu,
newly
discovered government records revealed not only that
intelligence reports and data contradicted the claim
that the mass removal and incarceration program
was justified by military necessity, but also that the

Justice Jackson’s usage of Korematsu and Hirabayashi as
precedent in Harisiades (see p. 16, supra), on which the
government relies (Gov’t Br. 23), brought this warning to life.
In Harisiades, a noncitizen claimed that due process protected
his liberties in the same way it does the rights of citizens. But
Korematsu and Hirabayashi, Justice Jackson wrote, show that
even citizens are unprotected from far-reaching government
claims of national security. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591 & n.17
(“When citizens raised the Constitution as a shield against
expulsion from their homes and places of business, the Court
refused to find hardship a cause for judicial intervention.”).
Constrained by stare decisis, Justice Jackson applied Korematsu
as standing precedent to reject Harisiades’ constitutional claim.
That application to the specific facts in Harisiades extended
Korematsu’s principle of extreme deference to “new purposes”—
precisely the danger Justice Jackson predicted in his “loaded
weapon” warning. 323 U.S. at 246.
2
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government knew as much when it convinced the
Court to affirm the defendants’ convictions. 3
In 1983, armed with those newly discovered
records, Yasui, Hirabayashi, and Korematsu filed
coram nobis petitions seeking to vacate their
convictions. As the court found in the Hirabayashi
case, government records showed that General
DeWitt’s Final Report had been materially altered in
order to fabricate an acceptable factual justification
for the mass removal and incarceration program.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445,
1456-1457 (W.D. Wash. 1986). Although the version
of the report presented to this Court stated that it
was impossible to identify potentially disloyal
Japanese Americans in the time available, a prior
printed version—submitted to the War Department
while the government’s briefs in Hirabayashi and
Yasui were being finalized—made clear that the
decision to issue the challenged orders had nothing to
do with urgency. Rather, General Dewitt’s decision
turned on his view that Japanese Americans were
inherently disloyal on account of their “ties of race,
intense feeling of filial piety and *** strong bonds of
common tradition, culture and customs.” Id. at 1449.
“It was not that there was insufficient time in which
to make such a determination” the original report
stated; “a positive determination could not be made
[because] an exact separation of the ‘sheep and the
goats’ was unfeasible.”
Id. (quoting Lieutenant
Those records are discussed at length in Justice at War: The
Story of the Japanese American Internment Cases by Peter
Irons, who, along with Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, unearthed them.
3
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General John L. DeWitt, Final Report: Japanese
Evacuation from the West Coast ch. 2 (1942)).
Beyond exposing the racist underpinnings of
General DeWitt’s orders (as well as the pretextual
nature of the claim of urgency), the coram nobis cases
revealed that the government had information
rebutting the assertion in the DeWitt Report that
Japanese Americans were involved in sabotage and
espionage. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d
591, 601 (9th Cir. 1987). The Office of Naval
Intelligence (“ONI”), which the President charged
with monitoring West Coast Japanese American
communities, had determined in its official report
that Japanese Americans were overwhelmingly loyal
and posed no security risk. ONI thus recommended
handling any potential disloyalty on an individual,
not group, basis. ONI found, contrary to the
government’s representation to this Court, that mass
incarceration was unnecessary, as “individual
determinations could be made expeditiously.” Id. at
602 n.11 (emphasis added); see also IRONS, supra, at
203. In addition, reports from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) and Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) directly refuted claims in the
DeWitt Report that Japanese Americans were
engaged in shore-to-ship signaling, intimating
Japanese American espionage. Korematsu, 584 F.
Supp. at 1417. Indeed, FBI Director Hoover wrote to
Attorney General Biddle shortly before President
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 that the push
for mass racial handling was based on politics rather
than facts. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir.
FBI to Francis Biddle, Att’y Gen. (Feb. 2, 1942).
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Department of Justice attorney John Burling,
co-author of the government’s brief, sought to alert
the Court of the FBI and FCC intelligence that
directly refuted the DeWitt Report. Burling included
in his brief a crucial footnote that read: “The recital
[in General DeWitt’s report] of the circumstances
justifying the evacuation as a matter of military
necessity *** is in several respects, particularly with
reference to the use of illegal radio transmitters and
to shore-to-ship signaling by persons of Japanese
ancestry, in conflict with information in the
possession of the Department of Justice.” Korematsu,
584 F. Supp. at 1417 (emphasis and citation omitted).
But high-level Justice Department lawyers stopped
the brief’s printing. Despite Burling’s vociferous
protest about the DeWitt Report’s “intentional
falsehoods,” the footnote was diluted to near
incoherence, even implying the opposite of Burling’s
intended message. As revised, the footnote stated:
[The DeWitt Report] is relied on in this
brief for statistics and other details
concerning the actual evacuation and the
events that took place subsequent thereto.
We have specifically recited in this brief the
facts relating to the justification for the
evacuation, of which we ask the Court to
take judicial notice, and we rely upon the
Final Report only to the extent that it
relates to such facts.
Gov’t Br. 11 n.2, Korematsu v. United States, No. 22
(U.S. Oct. 5, 1944). Notwithstanding an earlier
warning from Justice Department lawyer Edward
Ennis that failing to alert the Court to the contrary
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intelligence in DOJ’s possession “might approximate
the suppression of evidence,” Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d
at 602 n.11 (citation omitted), the Justice
Department concealed from the Court this crucial
evidence on military necessity.
In light of the evidence presented, the courts
hearing Fred Korematsu and Gordon Hirabayashi’s
coram nobis cases concluded that the government’s
misconduct had effected “a manifest injustice” and
that the mass removal and incarceration program
had been validated based on unfounded charges of
treason. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1417;
Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1447. 4 In granting
Korematsu’s coram nobis petition, Judge Patel
articulated the modern significance of the wartime
cases:
Korematsu *** stands as a constant caution
that in times of war or declared military
necessity our institutions must be vigilant
in protecting constitutional guarantees. It
stands as a caution that in times of distress
the shield of military necessity and
national security must not be used to
protect governmental actions from close
scrutiny and accountability. It stands as a
caution that in times of international
hostility and antagonisms our institutions,
In Minoru Yasui’s coram nobis case, the court acceded to the
government’s request to vacate his conviction and dismiss his
petition for relief without making any determinations regarding
government misconduct—and without acknowledging the
injustice he suffered.

4
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legislative, executive and judicial, must be
prepared to exercise their authority to
protect all citizens from the petty fears and
prejudices that are so easily aroused.
Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.
In
vacating
Korematsu,
Yasui,
and
Hirabayashi’s convictions, the coram nobis courts
joined other institutions of government in recognizing
the wrongs committed against Japanese Americans
during World War II. In 1976, on behalf of the
Executive Branch, President Ford officially rescinded
Executive Order 9066, explaining that “[w]e now
know what we should have known then—not only
was *** evacuation wrong, but Japanese-Americans
were and are loyal Americans.”
Presidential
Proclamation 4417, “An American Promise,” 41 Fed.
Reg. 7714 (Feb. 19, 1976). The Executive Branch
also recognized the contributions of the three men
who challenged the military orders.
Each one
received the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the
nation’s highest civilian honor: Fred Korematsu in
1998, Gordon Hirabayashi in 2012, and Minoru Yasui
in 2015.
In 1983, after extensive hearings and research,
the congressionally-authorized Commission on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
(CWRIC) issued a report concluding that it was not
“military necessity” that underpinned the program of
removal and incarceration, but rather “race
prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political
leadership.” REPORT OF CWRIC, PERSONAL JUSTICE
DENIED 459 (The Civil Liberties Public Education
Fund & University of Washington Press, 1997). Five
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years later, Congress passed (and President Reagan
signed) the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which, on the
CWRIC’s recommendations, acknowledged the
injustice of the removal and incarceration program,
issued an official apology, and conferred symbolic
reparations to the survivors of the incarceration
centers.
Most recently, in 2011, the Acting Solicitor
General confirmed what the coram nobis cases had
established decades earlier: this Court’s decisions in
the wartime cases were predicated on lies. “By the
time the cases of Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred
Korematsu reached the Supreme Court, [DOJ] had
learned of a key intelligence report that undermined
the rationale behind the internment. *** But the
Solicitor General did not inform the Court of the
report despite warnings *** that failing to alert the
Court ‘might approximate the suppression of
evidence.’ Instead, he argued that it was impossible
to segregate loyal Japanese Americans from disloyal
ones.” Confession of Error, supra.
*

*

*

During World War II, this Court’s refusal to
probe the government’s claim that military necessity
justified the mass removal and incarceration of
Japanese Americans made it unwittingly complicit in
the government’s deception. The Court’s blank-check
treatment of the Executive Branch’s wartime
policies—underscored by its repeated refusal to
confront the most grievous aspects of those policies or
to acknowledge their racist underpinnings—allowed
the wrongs inflicted on Japanese Americans to
continue unabated for years, and allowed the
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government to avoid accountability for its egregious
misconduct for decades.
Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu are
powerful reminders not only of the need for constant
vigilance in protecting our fundamental values, but
also of the essential role of the courts as a check on
abuses of government power, especially during times
of national and international stress. Rather than
repeat the failures of the past, this Court should
repudiate them and affirm the greater legacy of those
cases: Blind deference to the Executive Branch, even
in areas in which decision-makers must wield wide
discretion, is incompatible with the protection of
fundamental freedoms. Meaningful judicial review is
an essential element of a healthy democracy.
Consistent with those principles, this Court
should reject the government’s invitation to abdicate
its critical role in our constitutional system, subject
Executive Order 13780 to searching judicial scrutiny,
and stand—as Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui,
and Fred Korematsu did—as a bulwark against
governmental
action
that
undermines
core
constitutional values.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should
affirm the decisions below.
Respectfully submitted.
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